

Pál Tamás:

## **RADICAL RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGIES AT THE START OF THE 2006 POLITICAL SEASON**

The 2006 spring elections gave a second chance in line to the moderate Left in Hungary to govern. The acting Social Democratic- Left Liberal government of Ferenc Gyurcsany received a clear majority in the Parliament. That was the first case in the post -1989 political history of the country, when an acting government remained at its posts, and even with improved results, if compared to its support at the previous elections of 2002. At the same time it was clear for both the government and the old/new opposition, that the budget deficit of the country is worsening and the expected convergence with the Euro zone will force immediate introduction of a radical austerity program by the new government. And that was announced by the Gyurcsany cabinet to the public just almost the next morning after their triumphal election night. The radicalising elite of the Fidesz, the major right-wing opposition party, headed by Viktor Orban [PM of Hungary, 1998-2002], deeply frustrated by their repeated defeat decided to use the wave of broad dissatisfaction with the austerity program and used non-parliamentary forms of political activities [petitions for referendums, protest marches, mass demonstrations, media scandals, etc.] during the Summer and early Fall to destabilize the situations and return to the power via the streets. Problems in the governmental communication machine and the out-of-parliamentary ambitions of the Parliamentary Right concluded to street scenes in September-October in Budapest inexperienced in their scope and brutality in the after 1989 Central Europe.

The emergence of a new radical right on the streets forced us to reinterpret the identities and concepts of right wing politics in the contemporary Hungary.

### **NEW DATA**

The events of 2006 present important new circumstances for the new Hungarian interpretations of right-wing politics. The most significant among these is considered to be not so much the strengthening of right-wing radicalism itself, but rather the realignment of power relations between right-wing radicalism and the centre right. Recent Hungarian social research has devoted little attention to the supporters, arguments and strategy of the radical right. We have not yet embarked on this job systematically either, just on the periphery of our other research we routinely asked people to place themselves alongside a left-right axle. Similarly to other researchers we have been using this question as routine for years and originally we did not even think that it would ever come to play a special role. Nevertheless, it struck us at first review of the responses received in our August 2006 representative survey that the percentage of people who positioned themselves on the extreme right was far more marked than usual or customary earlier. We made a mental note of this but did not think at that time that this phenomenon needed to be analysed immediately. However, a few weeks later the right-wing protest movements entered the scene and their representatives claimed that the principal source of their protest was the recently published speech of the prime minister made at Öszöd. This implied that the movement was sudden and spontaneous. So we too found it interesting that a few weeks before the release of the ominous Öszöd speech we had already encountered these mobilised radical groups that, however, had not yet elected the forms of public protest. In disposition and choice of values a group that seemed much larger than earlier, had already been on the scene and went into motion in a way that took many people by surprise. It was this layer that interested us, but we could operate

exclusively with the information gathered in the above-mentioned two researchers (a representative research involving 1000 people on the relationship of the churches and the society, and another representative survey covering 1500 people on the future image of the Hungarian society). A comprehensive and systematic research on the reach of radical right-wing ideologies, the career profiles of the activists and the strategies of protest should have worked partly with other questionnaires and partly with other non-questionnaire-based research methods. But our aim, there and then, was no other than to answer the question marks in information by utilising the available data however fragmented they were.

Some basic questions are always raised when studying extreme right-wing groups:

- a. what predestines the articulation of extreme right-wing political opinions: earlier family confrontation with the pre-1989 regime, personal fiascos suffered after '89, or a historic and geopolitical conception differing from the one held by the majority?
- b. how stable and at the same time, how closed are the Hungarian extreme right groups?
- c. where are those bridges through which the values and history concepts produced by the extreme right can enter the quarters of much broader, more moderate and maybe slightly pro-left groups?
- d. what are the generation gaps, if any, in Hungary in this respect? We know that for example, in the eastern part of Germany radicalism is a typical young sub-culture and its popularity is growing in that medium especially. But in the western provinces radical right-wing ideologies are more frequent among the elderly. Well, are we then "eastern" or rather "western" type in this respect?

Naturally, we cannot answer the question how the opinion potential identified by us in August could grow into active participation in the protest movements of September and October, nor can we say whether besides, or instead of some of these groups others were also mobilised. Consequently, we do not have answers to the question who, and on what considerations participated in the street protest actions in September-October, or whether there were also such partisans of these actions who had not been mobilised earlier. But we can assume that if someone placed themselves on the right-wing with a score of 9 on the 1-10-grade scale in August 2006, could not be very far from that approach a few weeks later either. What we can see is that public opinion can easily shift even in the matter of 2-3 weeks and that even changes of a few percentage points can offer divergent interpretations. Consequently, although both our August researches showed similar radical right-wing mobilisation, the basic parameters of the mobilised people differed on certain points. So there are such diversions in the respect of the basic parameters of the groups calling themselves right-wing and covered by the two researches, which bid caution, but this will be discussed later on.

Naturally, from the same surveys we also have data about the ideological views of these people who call themselves left-wing. But since the left-wing was not involved in any radical actions in the period discussed and we have no information about any radical shifting in the second half of 2006 either, these groups only have marginal interest for us here.

We know from German research [Walter, 2002; Decker, 2004; Stöss, 2005; Winkler, 2005] that the activity and the reach of the values of the radical right-wing also show radical territorial differences. This means that while similar opinions spread more or less to the same degree in the eastern and the western provinces of Germany, we can speak about political activity and occasionally violent actions in the eastern part rather. We know little about such marked regional differences here in Hungary, but it

can be seen that although radicalism is rather powerful in the small towns, the street movements were confined – not surprisingly – almost everywhere to the large cities. This had not exclusively logistic reasons – the critical mass of the participants, the lack of public scenes in other localities, etc. – but also behavioural ones (for example, in smaller communities the opinions are more latent in any directions). Otherwise our categories do not imply radical right-wing political formations in the original sense of the word. Although the external scene is being organised here, there are large differences in size between the people who list themselves right-wing in our questionnaires, and the participants of this scene. Consequently, it is not implied by any means the 16-17% groups in our samples would, in any manner, be automatically mobilised on this side permanently.

#### INTERNAL SEGMENTATION

Although we are talking here exclusively about self-classification, and the respondents did not have to identify with any explicit or listed values, nor did we put any left-wing or right-wing labels on any of the statements or values, we know from literature and from other sources that in this ideological segment we usually identify the followers of three distinct and not even automatically connected ideologies:

- a. Xenophobes, for whom identification with this ideology means primarily anti-Roma sentiments under the prevailing circumstances in Hungary,
- b. People who, because of their own economic failures harbour anti-elite sentiments and who will occasionally adopt some strange anti-capitalist approach,
- c. Radical nationalists for whom the revision of Trianon and radical change of the legal status of the Hungarian minorities have become a central program.

A more detailed research could delve more profoundly into these ideological formations. We only intend to indicate here that, according to our data, the three issues are connected yet they do not overlap and the public opinions formulated react to a great degree to whether a statement is admitted or morally prohibited in the given political space. Being anti-elite is perfectly admissible in this respect. Rather extreme views may also be articulated in the matter of Trianon (at most the majority will consider them rather silly but will not condemn them on moral grounds). But it is practically prohibited to express xenophobic views in political manifestations or simply in communication with strangers. So for the most part the eventual data will not reflect the true opinions, but rather what the public considers politically correct. The German findings suggest that the radical right-wing views are fuelled not primarily by the respondent's own personal economic difficulties or failures, but rather by his distance from the political system. This seems to be conditionally confirmed from other sources on radical right-wing groups in our country too, but our data cannot be evaluated in this respect. But there apparently are gender differences. In the former GDR the difficulties brought about by the change of regime hit young women harder than men and women also pinned higher hopes on the change of regime. Consequently, they were more disappointed later than men, yet they did not shift more dramatically to the right than men. Women blamed their failure on their personal inaptitude and experienced them as a psychological burden, a defeat but not as failure involving the entire society. Men perceive the lack of success more like a social matter and tend to seek the solutions in the public scene. According to our data, the differences in the levels of activity are important, but the percentage of women among the radicals is more or less identical, perhaps a little

higher than that of men. This presumably implies such emotional reactions which are different from those found in Germany, but our findings do not yet extend to this. WINKLER, 2000, points out in his review that recent literature is not clear in the respect whether right-wing radicals have become proletariat yet or not. Some empirical works support this theory, while others deny it. The principal explanatory theory here will be relative deprivation. This means that those people will land in this category the most easily, who feel to be more deprived than others. But the personal poor situation will only generate radical right-wing ideologies if the affected people are also convinced that they are being treated unfairly. Consequently, there are two types of radical right-wing movements in Europe – one down and one up. For example, the Italian Lega Nord is expressly the party of the economically successful. The social attraction of Fidesz lies in the fact that for the time being it is capable of connecting the upper middle class and the [proletarianised radical] right wing. Naturally, the upper middle class also needs scapegoats. But this will not be national capital. The way they see things is that it is primarily immigrants and other ethnicities who “soil” the street.

### THE MOBILIZED GROUPS

The new battles are being fought between the Centre and the Periphery. The Centre differs from the peripheries on two elements. It also embraces other views and rejects violent, non-law-abiding solutions. Although in an ambivalent and not nationalist manner, but the centre does not reject globalisation and would also be willing to accept certain multi-cultural ideas.

Our August 2006 research shows that, like it always was earlier, centrism is more popular than the extreme views, but while there are three to four times as many centrists as radicals within the left-wing, the picture is much more balanced on the right side. There are roughly twice as many moderates as hard-core right-wingers. These latter, notably those respondents who elected grades 9-10 of the scale, constitute a 16.6-17.4% group. This profile is much higher than customary in other similar researches.

We thought that one of the easiest-to-grab questions of the August surveys was the formulation of the transitions. In the West European samples the transitions between the “civil right” and the “extreme right” are clear-cut. There are differences in terms of social status, views and the connections between the two political camps are very loose, often minimal. Left-wing and liberal publications regularly accuse Fidesz of failing to map this difference and at variance with the West European right-wing parties it is even trying to address both camps consequently, it is double-faced. But according to our approximate measurements, with this undoubtedly existing strategy Fidesz actually maps the structure of the opinions within the Hungarian right-wing. More precisely, it seems that polarisation is rather gradual on the centrists and the radicals. We find very big bridging groups between the two marked positions. As presented here, the borderlines in terms of ideology and opinions between the conservative and the radical right-wing are far more relative in Hungary than in Western Europe.

The analysis of the data produces such radical right-wing profiles which differ from the widely known sociological commonplaces. For example, contrary to the general belief that the majority of women have left-wing affiliations while the hard-core right-wing is male-dominated, our data show that this is exactly the other way round. There are slightly less men and far more women than in the sample average among those respondents who identified with the hard-core right-wing sentiments formulated in questions 9 and 10. The percentage of women was particularly high

among “hard-core right-wing” partisans in the church questionnaire, and that of moderate right-wingers in the future image survey. We presume (but cannot prove statistically) that the government communication of the summer, the presentation of the upcoming measures as some kind of looming “black cloud” had somewhat harsher impact on women than on men. In general, the communication style of last summer which focused on the expected austerity measures affected women more sensitively than men.

The age differences of the left- and the right-wing also deserve emphasis. It is true that in the 18-29 age group the percentage of hard-core right-wingers is bigger than in the sample (although this does not apply in the future image survey). But it is not true that in contrast left-wingers would be dramatically older. More importantly, the radical right is over-represented among young people and in the over-60 age group, and is somewhat below the average among the middle-aged. The biggest – downward – difference has been identified within the hard-core right-wing in the 40-49 age group. But more young people elect the centre right than the extreme right. The future image survey, however, tends to produce the stereotype. Right-wingers are clearly younger than left-wingers and the percentage of young people is higher among moderate right-wingers than among those subscribing to harsher rightist views. Here, however, the middle-aged are over-represented. In the respect of this question the two researches contradict one another. The only possible conclusion is that the two representative survey conducted a few weeks apart indicate different emphases. Simple judgement is probably misleading (also) in this respect.

At the same time, radical right-wing views are over-represented in the county seats and in the small cities (in the future image survey, even in the villages). In the church survey we encounter more than average radical views in the county seats, while the percentage of the radicals is far more modest in Budapest than in any other type of settlement in the country. In any case, the left-wing is far more strongly represented in Budapest, than the right-wing. As far as education is concerned, people with 8 or fewer grades of primary school and graduates of tertiary education represent slightly higher percentage than the national average on the radical right-wing (scale grades 9 and 10). But in neither case is the diversion from the average dramatic. People with secondary education are represented on the radical right-wing with approximately average values, while skilled workers remain below the sample average in one research and slightly exceed it in the other. In any case this contradiction does not suggest that in Hungary the hard-core right-wing would have dramatically strong roots in the working class, as presumed by some West European analysts. Naturally, with time series and more data we could get a much refined picture.

It is not very surprising either that the percentage of right-wing partisans is higher than left-wingers among those people who belong to some church or religious group. But it is striking that in the numerous moderate right-wing groups their percentage only slightly exceeds the sample average. In the radical groups this percentage is indeed higher. This shifting is rather surprising because in this context belonging to a church does not bid moderation in the given political field, on the contrary, it pushes people towards even more marked radical roles. Within the group that identifies most with their church the percentage of respondents who elect the most definite right-wing affiliation (grade 10) is twice as high as the sample average. But there are also such groups, even if below the sample average, who subscribe to pro-right-wing views but are not, or not definitely, religious. At the same time, although the percentage of right-wingers is almost twice as high in the religious core as that of left-wingers, the proportion of left-wingers with strong religious affiliations is not negligible either. It follows from the above that right-wingers welcome the definite

involvement of the churches in education and social care. Here the centrists demand more than hard-core right-wingers the co-operation of the state and church, the individual and the society in matters of kindergarten education, primary education and to a lesser degree, in higher education as well. The radical right-wing considers old-age-care the joint task of state and church more than the other groups. At the same time this group more or less falls in with the sample average in terms of considering the organisation of the lives of pregnant women and young mothers to be the task of the church. It scores above the average in considering a church task the aid of the poor and is rather ambivalent on helping refugees, but the views of this group are not dramatically different from the national average in the matter of hospital care. The radical and the moderate right-wing groups are markedly divided over the state financing of the education and social sphere of the churches. While the moderate right-wing is only slightly above the sample average in wishing full state support, and slightly below the average in patronising full believer financial support, in the radical group twice as many people as the sample average want that the state completely support to the education and social networks of the churches. In the radical group far fewer people than the average think that these networks should be financed by the believers. Although many more fine-tuned analyses will be required here too, it seems in first approach that the radical right-wing was far more attached to the churches in Hungary in August 2006 than presumed by public opinion or even by our own earlier research.

Like always, only half of the respondents were willing to answer questions concerning their income. These data are again rather contradictory. While in the church questionnaire the income of the right-wing partisans exceeded the income of the left-wingers, in the future image survey the ratio was reverse, the average income of the left-wingers was somewhat lower than the income of the right-wingers. It is true that here the differences between the groups were relatively smaller. The high income of the radical right-wingers in the church questionnaire suggests that the relative high-earners vote right, while the future image questionnaire returned contrary findings. In any case more clear results can only be expected from further detailed research in this field.

## IDEOLOGIES

Our data derived from the future image research are meant to demonstrate that left-wing and right-wing positions do not simply reflect to party policies or the concrete actions of politicians, but differ from one another in a much wider context. In fact, the two political poles perceive a different world image, social order, success/failure and conflict density around themselves, also in areas independent from the government/opposition dichotomy.

Naturally, it is not really surprising that the respondents should rate on a 10-grade scale the state of the prevailing political system now and in ten year's time according to their political affiliation. Neither is it surprising that they rate this state below medium (at 3.58 on the 10-grade scale) and that only the "hard-core left" puts the medium mark in the middle. The moderate right and left put the mark around the sample average and the hard-core right-wing has worse opinion about it than all the other groups. We wish to stress that we did not ask the respondents to rate the performance of the government, but the state of the political system, and at first approach this radical right-wing pessimism about the system seems to indicate that these groups – similarly to other European movements – are rather outside the political system. The order of "alienation" of the different political camps from the political system is practically unchanged in the pre-calculated scale and approaches

the average performance also in the expectations of the two right-wing groups. But variation within the groups is rather significant. When we classify the present and future states of the political system in three groups, that is the worst that can be mapped here, mediocre and almost ideal, we see that almost 80% of the radical right-wing respondents consider the current state the worst possible, and as many as 46% think the same about the state of the political system in ten years' time. The left-wing is definitely more optimistic both about the current and the future states. The single most important statement of this summary can, perhaps, be seized in this context. Among the left-wing and right-wing partisans, and inside those groups, among the radicals and the moderates large difference can be identified between the optimists and the pessimists also in the areas independent from the government or not even affected by it. The right-wing respondents considered so bad not only the situation prevailing in August 2006, but also the future prospects. In the referenced research we did not ask the respondents whether they saw any chance for a change of roles between the political sides. So we do not know whether there would be any difference in this respect between the left and the right sides. What we do see, however, is that the right-wing groups, and especially the radical ones, do not trust that such positive changes will unfold in the next few years in the system and the directions of movement of the world surrounding which will entail substantial qualitative and quantitative changes.

#### A SMALL APOCALYPSE?

We know practically nothing about the cause-effect relationships. We do not have sufficient data to prove that the deep universal pessimism reflected in August 2006 was the consequence of the repeated parliamentary defeat of the right side. Neither do we claim, although this research seems to suggest, that those people who are discontent with the world and do not find their place in it, are inclined to choose the political right side, and even its more radical branches. But even so we can state that the relationship between ideology and the choice of political side (whatever the direction of its determination) is different from the traditional West European one. There, the left side has coexisted with the criticism of the prevailing social system. Those who were satisfied, or at least came to terms with the world and their position in it, drifted in relatively small numbers towards the left-side movements that represented a critical approach to society. Naturally, right-wing criticism and discontent have been continuously present since the 1920's and 1930's, but their reach, at least since 1945, has been more modest than that of the left-wing one. And it is more modest today too. In contrast to the above the August 2006 research showed a picture with a reverse sign. Left-wingers are more satisfied or more trusting. The right-wing reactions are predominantly of a reverse sign. Naturally, both the radical left-wing and right-wing perceive more powerful crisis phenomena than the entire sample, but the crisis perceptions of the two extreme positions are different. The radical left considers alarming the state of the nature, the organised crime situation and terrorism. And at variance with the widely held stereotypes, this group is also concerned about the dangers threatening the Hungarian communities living beyond the borders. The radical right maintains a gloomier picture of the overall situation than the other groups of the society, and considers as especially important conflict sources tensions with our neighbours, the state of the European Union, the oppression of the Hungarians living beyond the borders, the overall state of the political system, the cultural and ethnic tensions and finally the collapse of the healthcare system. Both extreme positions perceive bigger than average dangers in the deterioration of the standard of living and in old-age care.

The most marked differences between the left and the right are perceived in their views on the direction and presumed intensity of the changes of the next 5-6 years. The left-wing is not seeing things in rose either, but there are dramatic differences in the views of the two sides on the magnitude of the expected deterioration. While the majority of the entire left-wing (radicals and moderates alike) believe that the country's situation will obviously worsen (52.7% believe that it will worsen, and 20.2% that it will significantly worsen), We are not talking about the deep pessimism of the entire right side (radicals and moderates). 86.5% of them believe that the situation will worsen, and 51.6% that it will significantly worsen. The differences by political pole are much bigger here than the differences measured by age, education or any other criteria. At the same time, the different views within the right side are also important in this profile. While on the moderate right side 21% believe that the country's state will not change, 42% think that it will worsen and 20% that it will significantly worsen, the corresponding categories on the radical right side amount to 11%, 44% and 31%. So radicalism, in the language of our question, holds strong deterioration more probable than continuation of the status quo.

We do not want to derive far-reaching conclusions from a few selected data but that much is apparent that those people who identify with the right side seem to have come to terms more with the budding Hungarian capitalism, than the right side and the radical right in particular. This seems to suggest that the radical right-wing criticism of the prevailing system lies in a political vacuum for the time being and those people who are discontent with the system or downright reject it gather on the other side mostly. This is so also if no consistent critical theory exists there and if the negative judgement of the personal fate and the state of the country is naturally mixed in the individual opinions, ideologies.

## TABLES

Table No.1.

### Political self-identifications 2006

	Survey I. (Church)	Survey II. (Future visions)
Radical left	12,2%	10,9%
Moderate left	41,2%	37,4%
Moderate right	30,1%	34,3%
Radical right	16,6%	17,4%
Together	100,0% N=770	100,0% N=1178
Absent answers	232	322

Table No.2

### Transition of self-identifications among right-wing voters

		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-x	Together	
							(%)	(N)
Political self-identifications	Radical left	17,7%	13,9%	16,9%	23,5%	28,0%	100,0%	94
	Moderate left	17,8%	16,6%	18,3%	19,8%	27,5%	100,0%	317
	6	24,7%	14,7%	20,0%	18,8%	21,8%	100,0%	121

2006	7	32,7%	24,4%	12,9%	11,3%	18,7%	100,0%	61
	8	26,7%	28,8%	20,0%	6,8%	17,7%	100,0%	50
	9	25,0%	12,2%	16,6%	16,9%	29,3%	100,0%	40
	Radical right	26,0%	16,1%	11,4%	18,0%	28,5%	100,0%	88
Together		21,9%	17,1%	17,2%	18,2%	25,6%	100,0%	769

Table No.3  
Political self-identifications by age

	<b>Survey on Church-State relationships</b>				<b>Together</b>
	<b>Radical left</b>	<b>Moderate left</b>	<b>Moderate right</b>	<b>Radical right</b>	
18-29	17,7%	17,8%	27,2%	25,7%	21,9%
30-39	13,9%	16,6%	20,3%	14,9%	17,1%
40-49	16,9%	18,3%	18,1%	13,0%	17,2%
50-59	23,5%	19,8%	14,3%	17,7%	18,2%
60-x	28,0%	27,5%	20,1%	28,7%	25,6%
Together	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N=	94	317	231	128	769
	<b>Survey on the Perceptions of Future</b>				<b>Together</b>
	<b>Radical left</b>	<b>Moderate left</b>	<b>Moderate right</b>	<b>Radical right</b>	
18-29	14,5%	21,4%	26,8%	18,9%	22,1%
30-39	10,5%	15,8%	20,0%	19,9%	17,4%
40-49	12,6%	17,6%	14,9%	20,3%	16,6%
50-59	18,4%	17,7%	18,2%	18,2%	18,0%
60-x	44,0%	27,5%	20,1%	22,8%	25,9%
összesen	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N=	129	440	404	205	1178

Table No.4. Political self-identifications by educational background

<b>Educational Background</b>	<b>Survey on Church-State relationships</b>				<b>Together</b>
	<b>Radical left</b>	<b>Moderate left</b>	<b>Moderate right</b>	<b>Radical right</b>	
8 classes and below	30,0%	36,9%	32,5%	36,7%	34,7%
Labour training schools	27,2%	18,7%	23,0%	16,2%	20,6%
High school	24,7%	30,9%	29,9%	30,4%	29,8%
College, university	18,1%	13,5%	14,6%	16,7%	14,9%
Together	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N=	94	317	231	128	769
<b>Educational Background</b>	<b>Survey on the Perceptions of Future</b>				<b>Together</b>
	<b>Radical left</b>	<b>Moderate left</b>	<b>Moderate right</b>	<b>Radical right</b>	
8 classes and below	41,5%	38,1%	31,2%	35,8%	35,7%
Labour training schools	16,4%	18,2%	23,0%	25,4%	20,9%
High school	28,7%	28,7%	29,1%	30,9%	29,2%
College, university	13,3%	15,0%	16,7%	7,9%	14,1%
Together	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N=	129	440	404	205	1178

Table No.5

## Political self-identifications by the intensity of religious practices

Religious practices#	Political self-identifications 2006				Together
	Radical left	Moderate left	Moderate right	Radical right	
Believer , framed by the Church		9,6%	12,9%	18,3%	11,7%
Believer, but according to his/her own understanding	8 classes and below	53,8%	57,9%	63,0%	56,3%
Unable to define, is he/she a believer, or not?	Labour training schools	3,9%	1,9%	3,3%	3,3%
Not religious	High school	29,3%	24,5%	12,8%	25,7%
Other views, definitely not believer	College, university	3,5%	2,8%	2,6%	3,0%
Together (N=765)	Together	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Note: #identifications with the given statements

Table No.6

## Optimism-pessimism in evaluations of national perspectives

The actual situation in Hungary becoming #	Political self-identifications 2006				
	Radical left	Moderate left	Moderate right	Radical right	Together
Much worst?	6,3%	13,9%	20,4%	31,2%	18,3%
Worst	20,4%	32,3%	42,5%	44,0%	36,5%
Without change	24,6%	24,1%	21,9%	11,5%	21,2%
Improving,	48,1%	28,8%	15,2%	12,6%	23,5%
Strongly improving,	,6%	,9%	0,0%	,8%	,5%
Together	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
(N=1138)	126	425	390	197	1138

Note: # is the situation in Hungary in the next 5-6 years becoming better or worst?

Table no.7.

## Expected style of societal change in Hungary

	Political self-identifications 2006				Together
	Radical left	Moderate left	Moderate right	Radical right	
Small steps, moderate changes	69,9%	55,1%	47,7%	45,1%	52,3%
Big steps, dramatic changes	16,3%	29,6%	37,2%	46,5%	34,0%
Mixed, both at the same time	13,7%	15,3%	15,2%	8,4%	13,7%
Together (N=869)	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

**Table No.8****Major determinants of a probable coming social-economic crises in Hungary**

<b>Determinants of the probable change</b>	<b>Political self-identifications 2006</b>				
	<b>Radical left</b>	<b>Moderate left</b>	<b>Moderate right</b>	<b>Radical right</b>	<b>Together</b>
<b>Natural environment, ecology</b>	36,4%	27,5%	31,2%	29,2%	30,0%
<b>Organised crime</b>	67,8%	52,0%	60,0%	58,9%	57,8%
<b>Terrorism</b>	52,5%	49,9%	51,0%	51,4%	50,9%
<b>Conflicts with neighbouring states</b>	64,8%	65,8%	70,3%	71,7%	68,8%
<b>Deep crises of the EU</b>	48,3%	46,2%	57,6%	63,8%	54,8%
<b>Strong oppression of Hungarian minorities and/or their out-migration to Hungary</b>	60,9%	44,1%	42,2%	57,3%	47,7%
<b>State of the Hungarian political system</b>	75,1%	85,6%	93,1%	93,5%	89,4%
<b>Cultural and ethnic conflicts in Hungary</b>	34,3%	34,7%	32,8%	49,6%	37,5%
<b>Decreasing living standards by large groups of the population</b>	92,3%	92,1%	91,8%	95,5%	92,8%
<b>Decreasing services and social security of elderly</b>	77,1%	67,9%	72,9%	77,4%	72,7%
<b>Collapse of important parts in the national health system</b>	81,1%	79,9%	80,3%	86,4%	81,6%

## REFERENCE

Decker, Frank: Der neue Rechtspopulismus. Opladen, 2004

Friedrich, Walter: Rechtsextremismus im Osten Ein Ergebnis der DDR-Sozialisation? Leipzig, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Sachsen, 2002

Grumke, Thomas, Klärner, Andreas: Rechtsextremismus, die soziale Frage und Globalisierungskritik. Eine vergleichende Studie zu Deutschland und Großbritannien seit 1990. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, 2006

Pfahl-Traughber, Armin: Die Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 39/2000

Rommelspacher, Birgit: Rechtsextremismus in Ost- und Westdeutschland im Vergleich. In: Gegen Rechtsextremismus in Ost und West. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Forum Berlin, 2006

Stöss, Richard: Rechtsextremismus im Wandel. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Berlin, 2005

Winkler, Jürgen R.: Rechtsextremismus: Gegenstand – Erklärungsansätze – Probleme. In: Wilfried Schubarth, Richard Stöss (Hg.), Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Bilanz. Opladen, 2000